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Stanley Fish 
Stanley Fish serves as Florida International University's Davidson-Kahn 
Distinguished University Professor ofHumanities and Law, maintaining 
a principal appointment in the College of Law and a lecturer role in the 
College of Arts and Sciences. He earned his bachelor's degree from the 
University of Pennsylvania and both his master's and doctorate degrees 
from Yale University. Considered one of the foremost authorities on 
English poet John Milton, he has taught English at the University of 
California at Berkeley, Johns Hopkins University and Duke University, 
where he also served as a law professor and as the executive director of 
Duke University Press. In 1999, he became dean of the College of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago and, 
in 2004, assumed his current position at Florida International University. 
Fish has appeared on many national television shows and has published 
a dozen books and hundreds of scholarly articles in the areas of 
literature and law, as well as regularly lectures on these topics at 
universities across the country. A prolific author, he has written for 
national publications such as The New York Times and The Chronicle of 
Higher Education as well as some of the country's leading law journals, 
including the Stanford Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Yale Law 
Journal, University of Chicago Law Review, Columbia Law Review and 
Texas Law Review. 
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There will be a reception immediately following the lecture in the 
Hirsch Hall Rotunda. 
The Sibley Lecture Series, established in 1964 by the Charles Loridans 
Foundation of Atlanta in tribute to the late John A. Sibley, is designed to 
attract outstanding legal scholars of national prominence to Georgia Law. 
Sibley was a 1911 graduate of the law school. 
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1. "Fish's account cannot tell us what the law is and is thus without any practical decision-
making importance." 
2. "Words do have meanings that we all agree upon." 
3. "A law is not a good law if it does not communicate anything to the public ." 
4. ''Fish's deconstruction intimates that interpreters are radically free to apply whatever 
context they may choose. The idea of a true or correct interpretation falls into the infinite 
regress of the infinite contexts in which a text can be placed." 
5. 'The question Fish should be asking is not 'Did the interpreter seek the author's intent?' 
but rather 'did the interpreter come up with the best interpretation of the text?"' 
6. "Fish's position begs the question of whether judges ought to analyze the legislative 
history or whether they ought to strictly adhere to the text when they interpret what a text 
means." 
7. "As the creator of these words, my conception of their meaning, my intent behind writing 
them, requites the exjstence of 'the other. "' 
8. "Can my intended meaning be shaped by imperfections of communication as I 
understand them?" 
9. "In other eras and in other cultures, religious painters did hot sign their works of art. 
They did not consider themselves the creators but merely the conduit." 
10. "May readers make assumptions about the author's intent and thereby circumvent the 
need to have the author readily available to answer questions?" 
11. "Fish argues that in order communicate, the author intended the symbols to have 
society's agreed upon meaning." 
12. "In literary works, authors have freedom to 'say' and 'not say' at their whim. Legal 
authors do not have the same freedom." 
13 . "Suppose that I write 1 + 1 ::::2. Perhaps I meant to write this as an explanation of what I 
ate for breakfast. As a rational actor, I know that my intentions will not be conveyed 
through this expression." 
14. 'The starting point of his anti-textualist position is the inherent ambiguity of language." 
15 . "Fish notes that the initial statement, literally construed, means one thing while his 
father's purpose was something else." 
16. "Fish's theory would allow one to make the very sexy critical move of saying that we do 
not have one constitution, we have many constitutions." 
17. "Fish may be right, but we must pretend that he is wrong. Legal scholars and 
practitioners should agree to treat text as though it does hold meaning in its((lf. If 
everyone assumes, even incorrectly, that meaning is to be found within statutory texts, 
le~islators are encouraged to draft statutes in clear language.'' 
18. "Fish argues that legal interpretation should focus on the intention of the author rather 
than on the plain meaning of the words alone." 
19. "In objective reality, there is only one text of Hamlet, and it is the result of a variety of 
intentions. Scholars can parse the language and argue that certain speeches were not 
penned by the same author of the rest of the text, and in objective reality this may be true. 
But that does not detract from the fact that Hamlet as a whole is a single unified text with 
its own 'meaning. ' So it is with legislation.'' 
20. "If Fish means to say that whenever a text has multiple authors whose meanings diverge, 
there are really multiple texts to be in,terpreted, judges are going to be upset. This would 
mean a single statute is actually many different texts, and Fish does not provide an 
answer as to which text a judge should apply." 
21 . "The legislature takes much more care with the drafting of legislation than it does with 
every day conversation, precisely to eliminate the kind of ambiguity that the writer 
illustrates with this example." 
22. "If the purpose of codifying law is to give the citizens an opportunity to conform their 
behavior, then this statute does not come-close to doi.Q.g so. It functions more as a 
subsidy to the legal profession." 
23 . ' 'There is not practical application of the position put forth in this paper." 
24. "May an interpreter act consistently with the intentionalist position by only considering 
the dictionary definition and the intention a reasonable person would associate with the 
words?" 
25 . "I maintain that the strict use of criteria to ascertain intent is not inconsistent with the 
intentionalist position. The most convincing evidence of intent may be the words 
themselves, and the intentions that most commonly correspond to those words." 
26. "If an intentionalist may look to objective criteria in ascertaining intent, the textualist and 
the intentionalist appear to be applying the same interpretive process, and probably 
reaching the same results . All that i~ requested ofFish is a brief statement as to whether 
or not the sole use of objective evidence of intent is consistent with the intentionalist 
position." 
